Plato’s theory of recollection is classically treated as an account of “concept-acquisition” or “concept-possession,” explaining how the mind is able to employ general concepts, despite the senses only perceiving particulars. Against this, recent scholars (esp. Dominic Scott) have argued that recollection is not necessary for ordinary reasoning. Recollection is not about ordinary concepts that humans use; rather, recollection is a rare, prototypically philosophic affair that is satisfied by becoming aware of Forms or principles associated with them, which most people never experience. On this view, most people do not recollect. A third position accepts both views: there are two types of recollection in Plato, one concerned with ordinary cognition, and one concerned with philosophical awareness of the Forms. This paper argues for the narrow reading, focusing on the Phaedrus. Link to online-first version here (please cite official published version with correct page numbers).

This article provides a rigorous defense of innate true belief in the Meno, to my knowledge, the first of its kind. While several commentators have proposed innate true belief in the past, the position has never been defended or explained in detail. Instead, the most thorough discussions of Plato’s innatism have opted for different innate objects. I defend my proposal against these recent alternatives by showing that the passages often thought to imply innate knowledge can arguably be better read in other ways. I then argue that they should be so read, because of an “awareness condition” Plato had on knowledge at the time. Link to online preprint here; please cite the published version.

This article considers six types of Platonic Innatism and compares them to the nativisms of early modern writers. I first dismiss a type of innatism similar to the target of the first book of Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding and then discuss four types of innatism that might be considered “live options” for the one Plato employs in his theory of recollection: a Kantian “constructivist” innatism, a Cartesian “dispositional” innatism, a Leibnizian “content” innatism, and a Malebranchian “transcendent” innatism. Finally, in closing, I discuss “condition innatism”. Though this last position is frequently referenced in Platonic scholarship, I argue that the position is incoherent. Please see the official, published, open-access version here: https://rivista.thaumazein.it/index.php/thaum/article/view/225/172​